

ILLEGIB

DCI/IC 78-1108  
16 January 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Intelligence Definitions Working Group

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

SUBJECT: Next Meeting

1. The 17 January 1978 meeting of the Intelligence Definitions Working Group was canceled because neither the Chairman nor Executive Secretary was available to meet at the scheduled time.

2. In preparation for the next meeting, Working Group members are asked to give careful consideration to the attached proposed definitions of Intelligence and Sensitive Intelligence Sources or Methods. Each of these terms has been discussed at length by the Working Group, which should reach for resolution at its next meeting. Devising an omnibus definition of Intelligence may be the Working Group's most challenging task; the attached proposal is but the latest in a number of attempts, but it seems to be getting closer. The proposed definition of Sensitive Intelligence Sources or Methods was developed by SECOM and OPP together, as the 10 January minutes indicated would be done.

3. The next meeting of the Working Group will begin at 1330, 24 January 1978, CHB Room 5S09.

[REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
As stated

MORI/CDF

INTELLIGENCE: (a) Knowledge acquired and furnished in response to the known or perceived requirements of policy or decisionmakers, and which is principally derived from information about another nation which is concealed from or not intended for the use of the acquiring nation. (See Intelligence Cycle.)

Examples:

- Policy development requires good intelligence.
- Timely intelligence is important to informed decisionmaking.

(b) A term used to refer collectively to the direct support or collateral functions, activities, or organizations which participate in the production of intelligence as defined in (a) above.

Examples:

- Intelligence is a demanding profession.
- Central Intelligence Agency.
- Human source collection is an important intelligence activity.

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS: A collective term for those persons, things, conditions, or events which provide intelligence information and those means used in the collection of such information which, if compromised, are vulnerable to counteraction that could reasonably be expected to reduce their ability to support U.S. intelligence activities.